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1 - Introduction 
 
International law does not impose an obligation of neutrality on States 
toward religions or beliefs. International and regional human rights 
instruments that deal with religious matters focus exclusively on the extent 
to which individuals shall enjoy the right to hold and manifest freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, and do not envisage particular obligations 
on the part of the State. States parties to human rights Conventions may be 
accountable before international treaty bodies, if they exist, yet these bodies 
have no competence on how a State should be organized internally.  
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is no exception 
to this framework. Article 9 and Article 2 of the First Protocol provide for 
the recognition of an individual’s freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion and for State’s respect for parents’ religious and philosophical 
convictions, but make no reference to the concept of State neutrality. 
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) acknowledges 
the regimes diversity that characterizes the European context and the 
impossibility to identify throughout Europe a uniform conception of the 
significance of religion in society1. Yet, neutrality has become increasingly 
                                                          
* Article peer evaluated. 
 
1 Otto Preminger-Institut v. Austria, app. no. 11/1993, ECtHR (Judgment), 23 August 
1994, par. 50. 
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relevant in the rulings of the ECtHR concerning religious freedom. In 
several cases, the Court has explicitly resorted to the idea that the exercise 
of public authority should be neutral toward religious matters, and that 
States should act as neutral and impartial organizers of religious life within 
their community2.  
The idea that neutrality is a precondition for a State’s full compliance 
with freedom of religion is inherent to international human rights law3. 
With reference to the ECHR, neutrality is to be regarded as one of the 
constitutive premises upon which rest the notions of freedom of religion, 
conscience and thought. The conception of neutrality underpins the 
foundations of the Convention in as much as the latter recognizes religious 
pluralism as one of its pillars. That said, neutrality as a State duty 
recognized by the ECtHR is quite a slippery concept. Firstly, because 
speaking of State neutrality implies coming to terms with the definition of 
the concept, which is far from controversial. State neutrality may in fact 
assume different meanings. It may be interpreted as equidistance of the 
State vis-à-vis all religions, meaning that the government actions should not 
favor any particular faith; it may refer to equality of treatment by the State 
toward different faiths; but neutrality could also consist of exclusion of 
religion from the public sphere, so that the State is either indifferent toward 
them or even oppose to the idea of allowing religion to enter the public 
domain4. All these differences are mirrored in the case law of the ECtHR, 
which has struggled to convey a homogenous and coherent definition of 
what State neutrality means.  
Aside from the difficulty of discerning the alternative modes of State 
neutrality adopted by Strasbourg judges when confronted with religious 
matters, a further issue comes to light when surveying the jurisprudence of 
the Court. In developing and applying different patters of neutrality toward 
religious matters that share a great deal of similarity, the Court appears to 
have been caught between two opposite tensions. On the one hand, there is 
a clear effort on the part of the ECtHR to develop a notion of State neutrality 
                                                          
2 Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, app. n. 41340/98; 51342/98, 
41343/98, ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 13 February 2003, par. 90.  
3 J. TEMPERMAN, The Neutral State: Optional or Necessary? A Triangular Analysis of 
State-Religion Relationships, Democraticisation and Human Rights Compliance, in Religion and 
Human Rights, n. I, 2006, p. 296 ss. 
4 W. KYMLICKA, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, in Ethics, vol. LXXXIX, 
1989, p. 883 s.; S. CLARKE, Consequential Neutrality Revivified, in Political Neutrality: A Re-
evaluation, edited by R. Merrill, D. Weinstoc, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014, p. 109 
s.  
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driven and inspired by classical liberal principles. Thus, in pursuit of these 
liberal aspirations, the Court has often resorted to conceptions that privilege 
the understanding of neutrality as ‘absence of coercion’ or ‘absence of State 
preferences’ toward one religion. On the other hand, there is a clear line of 
cases marked by the Court’s effort to endorse a notion of neutrality capable 
of accommodating the diversity of the constitutional orders and cultural 
traditions of European States. As an international adjudicative body, the 
Court is aware that it is beyond its powers to impose a unique model of 
religious neutrality in Europe. For this reason, the Court has accorded a 
wide margin of appreciation to States and it has remained open to different 
State-religion formula. Yet, the anxiety shown by the ECtHR toward the 
respect of different European religious models has often resulted in 
excessive deference vis-à-vis (certain) governmental policies that 
significantly curtail individual’s rights to freedom of religion and 
conscience.  
This contribution engages with these issues and seeks to critically 
discuss the notion of State neutrality in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights. The paper is premised on the recognition of State 
neutrality toward religious matters as a foundational value of the 
Convention, and builds almost exclusively on the analysis of the ECtHR 
rulings based upon this notion. The primary goal is to identify different 
patters of neutrality to which the Court resorts in order to solve disputes 
concerning freedom of religion and beliefs, and to test their coherence 
within the framework of the Convention. For this reason, doctrinal debates 
pertaining to the consequences of such neutrality, or questioning the extent 
to which a State obligation of neutrality should be enforced and promoted 
by the Court are left aside5.  
Given the breadth of the topic, the scope of the reasearch is focused 
on three different areas in which the notion of State neutrality was picked 
up by the Court: religious disputes, religious education in public schools 
                                                          
5 See in this regard, I. LEIGHT, The European Court on Human Rights and religious 
neutrality, in Religion in a Liberal State, edited by G. O’ Costa, M. Evans, T. Modood, J. Rivers, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014; J. WEILER, State and Nations; Church, 
Mosque and Synagogue - the trailer, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. VIII, 
2010; E. HOWARD, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European bans on the wearing 
of religious symbols in education,  Routledge, London, 2013; G. CASUSCELLI, Il divieto di 
indossare il niqab del codice penale belga all’esame della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo: un passo 
in avanti per la formazione del “precedente” che mette a rischio il pluralismo religioso, in Stato, 
Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 26 del 2017, 
especially p. 4; P. ANNICCHINO, Is the glass hald empty or half full? Lautsi v. Italy before the 
European Court of Human Rights, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., maggio 2010.  
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and institutions, and the presence of religious symbols in the public sphere. 
This choice of this taxonomy is explained by the fact that these three 
different areas allow for the identification of notions of State neutrality, 
which are not only distinctive, but at times also in conflict with each other. 
The last section of the work delves further into the notions of State religion 
neutrality and sheds some critical remarks on the approach adopted so far 
by the Court.  
 
 
2 - The meaning of State neutrality: some conceptual clarifications 
 
Neutrality as ground for the relationship between a State and religion finds 
source in liberal political theory. Among the tenets of liberalism rests the 
idea that in order for a State to treat its citizens as equals, that State must be 
neutral on what constitutes a good and valuable life6.  
The crucial assumption at the bottom of liberalism as philosophical 
doctrine is that individuals have different and irreconcilable conceptions of 
the good7. These individuals, participants of a liberal polity, regard 
themselves as free and equal, and expect to be given fair opportunities and 
space to be able to pursue their interests and concerns8. For this to be 
achieved, a State should accord enough freedom so as to allow individuals 
to follow their interests9, but it should also avoid upholding one particular 
idea of the valuable life. This is because to do so would necessarily amount 
to denying individuals holding different conceptions of the good the status 
of equal participants. In a liberal State, pluralism of ideas and ideologies 
should not only be conceived as a physiological consequence of any 
democratic society, but it should also be accommodated, since any attempt 
or actual removal of diversity would entail the exercise of a form of 
autocratic power10. Neutrality on the part of the State is therefore the 
                                                          
6 R. DWORKIN, Liberalism, in Public and Private Morality, edited by S. Hampshire, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. 127; W. KYMLICKA, Liberal 
Individualism, cit., 1989, p. 883 s.; S. CLARKE, Consequential Neutrality Revivified, cit., p. 109 
s  
7 J. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 193-
197. 
8 J. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, cit., p. 197. 
9 R. DWORKIN, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006, p. 76.  
10 R. DWORKIN, Liberalism, cit., p. 127. 
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essential procedural commitment11 for ensuring equality, pluralism and 
justice. It is the premise upon which values of liberty and equality among 
individuals can be respected and guaranteed, and at the same time it is the 
means the institutional apparatus resorts to in order to ensure justice and 
democracy within the State.  
Most liberal political theorists accept that when we talk about State 
neutrality vis-à-vis religious matters, we should keep in mind the notion of 
‘justificatory neutrality’ or ‘neutrality of aims’. Neutrality of aims builds on 
the idea that a government’s power should not be regulated in a way that 
presupposes endorsement of a particular conception of the good12. 
Neutrality does not require the State to make sure that its policies are 
neutral in their effects13. On the contrary, ‘neutrality of aims’ entails a 
restraint on the grounds that can be invoked to justify political decisions. 
Basically, “a decision can count as neutral only if it can be justified without 
appealing to the presumed intrinsic superiority of any particular conception 
of the good life”14. 
It has already been noted that the European Convention on Human 
Rights does not explicity recognize State neutrality in religious matters as a 
goal to be pursued under the Convention. Article 9, which provides the 
basic framework for freedom of religion, focuses only on the individual’s 
dimension of freedom of religion. In this regard, the Convention recognizes 
everyone’s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which 
includes both the right to change religion or beliefs, and the right to 
manifest religion. Furthermore, art. 9(2) affirms that limitations to freedom 
to manifest religion shall be permited provided that they are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health and morals, or for the protection 
of rights and freedoms of others15.  
                                                          
11 B. PASTORE, Quali fondamenti per il liberalismo? Identità, diritti, comunità politica, in 
Diritto e società, vol. III, 1997, p. 424 ss.  
12 J. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, cit., p. 193. 
13 This form of neutrality is defined as ‘consequential neutrality’. Consequential 
neutrality is achieved when governments policies are conducted in a way “that will neither 
improve nor hinder the chances that individuals have of living in accord with their 
conception of the good”, see J. RAZ, The Morality of Freedom, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, 
p. 108. 
14 C. LARMORE, Patters of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1987, p. 44. 
15 For an overview of the relationship between freedom of religion and the ECHR see: 
R. MAZZOLA (ed.), Diritto e Religione in Europa, rapporto sulla giurisprudenza della Corte 
Europea dei diritti dell’uomo in materia di libertà religiosa, il Mulino, Bologna, 2012; A. 
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There are therefore two dimensions which are afforded protection 
under the Convention: the internal dimension of freedom of religion, which 
consists of the right (not) to hold a religious belief, or to change it; and an 
external dimension, which concerns the right to manifest religion in the 
forum externum. The Convention recognizes that the forum internum cannot 
be subject to a State’s limitation and must be protected by the latter: this 
means that neutrality of the State in this context shall be absolute and 
understood as absension of the State from any form of (de)legimitimazion 
or approval of a particular belief16. As for the forum externum, the 
Convention recognizes that the manifestation of religion, whether exercised 
individually or collectively17, can be the object of State regulation. And it is 
very much in relation to this regulation that the Convention - or better, the 
Court through its jurisprudence - has a say on the permissible forms of 
relationship between religious institutions and the State18. Neutrality is 
therefore one of the “theories” or policies that the European Court of 
Human Rights has been developing and implementing with the view of 
building a consistent vision of freedom of religion and regulating the 
relation between the State and religion19.  
As a matter of fact, the principle that a State should be neutral toward 
religios matters can be traced back to the foundations of the Convention20. 
                                                          
GARDINO, La libertà di pensiero, di coscienza e di religione nella giurisprudenza della Corte 
europea di Strasburgo, in Libertà religiosa e laicità. Profili di diritto costituzionale, edited by G. 
Rolla, Jovene, Napoli, 2009; C. EVANS, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention of 
Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; J. MARTINEZ- TORRÓN, Religious 
Pluralism: the case of the European Court of Human Rights, in Democracy, Law and Religious 
Pluralism in Europe, edited by F. Requejo, C. Ungureanu, Routledge, London, 2014. 
16 J.P. CERIOLI, La tutela della libertà religiosa nela Convenzione Europea dei Diritti 
dell’Uomo, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., gennaio 2011, p. 10. 
17 See with reference to the collective dimension of freedom of religion, L. GARLICKI, 
Collective Aspects of the Religious Freedom: Recent Developments in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, in Censorial Sensitivities: Free Speech and Religion in a Fundamentalist 
World, edited by A. Sajo, Eleven International Publishing, Utrecht, 2007, pp. 218-219. 
18 C. EVANS, C. A. THOMAS, Church-State Relations in the European Court of Human 
Rights, in Brigham Young University Law Review, 2006, pp. 699 ss.  
19 J. RINGELHEIM, Rights, religion and the public sphere: The European Court of Human 
Rights in search of a theory?, in  A European Dilemma: Religion and the Public Sphere, edited by 
C. Ungureanu, L. Zucca, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 284; V. 
PACILLO, Secularism and International Standards Protecting the Freedom or Religion of Belief: 
Arguments for a Debate, in Il dir. eccl., 2006, pp. 142 ss; R. NIGRO, Il margine di apprezzamento 
e la giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo sul velo islamico, in Diritti Umani e 
Diritto Internazionale, 2008, pp. 71 -105.  
20 See also J. RINGELHEIM, State Religious Neutrality as a Common European Standard? 
Reappraising the European Court of Human Rights, in Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, vol. 
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In this regard, it might be argued that neutrality acts as a corollary of the 
principle of pluralism, which has been firmly established by the ECtHR a 
fundamental tenet of European democracies. In Kokkinakis v. Greece, the first 
ruling by the ECtHR on freedom of religion, the Court defined pluralism as 
one of the essential elements of a democratic society as well as the premise 
for the material enjoyment of the rights enshrined in Article 9 of the 
Convention21. The Court shared the classic liberal idea that “pluralism is 
built on the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and dynamics 
of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs (…)” 
and that “the harmonious interaction of persons and groups with varied 
identities is essential for achieving social cohesion”22. Hence, the State must 
be pluralistic and democratic if it wishes to fulfil the requirements of the 
Convention. And, in order for pluralism to flourish, the position of the State 
vis-à-vis religious matters should be one that acknowledges and 
accommodates religious diversity, without imposing or deliberately 
promoting one particular conception of the good.  
Having said that, State neutrality in the context of the European 
Court of Human Rights should be taken as a broad and flexible concept. 
The reason is twofold. First, from a purely international legal standpoint, 
the very idea of State neutrality is subject to multiple interpretations. There 
are in fact several ways for a State to act in a manner that purse ‘neutrality 
of aims’. For example, in its simplest form, State neutrality could be 
interpreted as indifference of the State toward preferences that individuals 
seek to maximize. But neutrality may also be understood as impartiality, 
meaning that the State shall not only refrain from imposing certain 
understanding of the good, but it should to some extend ensure 
equidistance with regard to different ideological conceptions. The latter 
interpretation of neutrality is more burdensome than the first one, as the 
State is not only required to abstain from actively interfering with one’s 
exercise of faith, but it must also ensure equality of treatment with regard 
to different religions. Finally, neutrality may also refer to the exclusion of 
religion from the public sphere, an understanding that entails sheer 
separation between religion and the State and presumes that State agents, 
official premises and private individuals operating in the public sphere 
refrain from externalizing religion beliefs or symbols.  
                                                          
VI, 2017, pp. 27-30; J.P. CERIOLI, La tutela della libertà religiosa, cit., p. 12.  
21 Kokkinakis v. Greece, app. no. 14307/88, ECtHR (Judgment), 19 April 1993, par. 31.  
22 Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, app. no. 44158/98, ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 17 
February 2004, par. 92. 
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Secondly, neutrality within the ECHR is a flexible concept because, 
as an international subsidiary mechanism, the European Court cannot 
impose a single State - religion model to be applied to the 47 members of 
the Convention. Throughout Europe, constitutional arrangements on 
religion and religious freedom are rich and diverse. Strict secularist models 
based on the principle of laicité23 (such as the one in Turkey and in France),24 
coexist along with models based on the presence of a State Church, and 
liberal constional frameworks that interpret the principle of pluralism as a 
positive recognition of the value of religious diversity (as in the case of 
Italy). This implies that the Court should be in principle willing to 
accommodate the diversity and pluralism of State - religion systems across 
the European context. The Court should, in other words, not advance a 
unique standard of neutrality in pursuit of a unitary State - religion model, 
but it should strive to set a minimal standard of reference that provides 
limitations to existing models25. 
 
 
3 - State’s neutrality vis-à-vis religious organizations: neutrality as 
impartiality 
 
It should be first noted that the ECtHR case law does not support the 
paradigm of ‘neutrality of aims’ in its strictest interpretation. The Court 
leaves to States a broad margin of interpretation as to the notion of 
pluralism and tolerance, and does not challenge as illegitimate the 
aspirations of a State to express some degree of preference for a specific 
religion. Accordingly, it has been argued that a State Church system within 
the European context cannot be considered in itself as violating Article 9 of 
the Convention26. In principle, the Court recognizes that States can appeal 
to their margin of appreciation to justify the existence of a State Church or 
                                                          
23 As for the meaning of the notion of laicité see R. DENOIX DE SAINT MARC, 
Introduction à la laicité en France, in Il diritto ecclesiastico, vol. CXIX, 2008, pp. 393-404.  
24 A.T. KURU, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion. The United States, France and 
Turkey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 161 ss.  
25 S. MANCINI, La supervisione europea presa sul serio: la controversia sul crocifisso tra 
margine di apprezzamento e ruolo contro-maggioritario delle corti, in Giurisprudenza 
Costituzionale, fasc. V, 2009, pp. 4057-4059; C. UNGUREANU, Europe and Religion: and 
ambivalent nexus, in A European Dilemma: Religion and the Public Sphere, edited by C. 
Ungureanu, L. Zucca, cit., pp. 308-309; F. TULKENS, The European Convention on Human 
Rights and Church-State Relations. Pluralism vs. Pluralism, in Cardozo Law Review, 2009, pp. 
2575-2591, and in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., February 2011. 
26 Darby v. Sweden, app. no. 11581/85, ECtHR (Judgment), 23 October 1990, par. 45.  
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the provision of certain pubState-religion arrangements which may favor a 
particular faith at the expenses of others. Following this line of argument, 
the Court has stated for example that a State’s possibility of financing, 
directly or indirectly, one of more religious organizations does not impair 
the position of the State as a guarantor of neutrality and pluralism27. 
Similarly, the fact that a State may enforce a law of blasphemy extending 
only to one faith does not necessarily violate principles enshrined in the 
Convention28.  
The legitimacy of differentiated State-religion relations can be 
explained out of respect of the Court for historical and cultural differences 
among European States29. Yet, the right of the State to maintain a particular 
relationship with a certain faith is not without restriction. In Refah Partisi v. 
Turkey, the Grand Chamber was faced with the question on whether the 
dissolution by the Turkish Constitutional Court of the shari’a-inspired 
political party Refah Partisi breached Articles 11 (freedom of association) of 
the Convention. In evaluating the legitimacy of the grounds for such 
dissolution, the Court, inter alia, weighed in on the party’s plan to set a 
plurality of legal systems in Turkey, and on the compatibility of shari’a law 
with the founding principles of the ECHR. The Grand Chamber upheld the 
Chamber’s conclusion, noting that a plurality of legal systems within a State 
cannot be considered compatible with the Convention, since  
 
“[It] would introduce into all legal relationships a distinction between 
individuals grounded on religion, would categorize everyone 
according to religious beliefs and would allow him rights and 
freedoms not as an individual but according to his allegiance to a 
religious movement”30.  
 
As for the compatibility of shari’a law with the principle enshrined 
in the Convention, the Grand Chamber referred again back to the 
Chamber’s decision, which established:  
 
“Sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogma and the divine rules laid 
down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism 
in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms 
have no place in it. […] In the Court’s view, a political party whose 
actions seem to be aimed at introducing sharia in a State party to the 
                                                          
27 Spampinato v. Italy, app. no. 23123/04, ECtHR (Admissibility) 29 March 2007 p. 7. 
28 Wingrove v. UK, app. no. 17419/90, ECtHR (Judgment), 25 November 1996, par. 50. 
29 In this sense, also Spampinato, cit., par. 2.  
30 Refah Partisi, cit., par. 119.  
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Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with 
the democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the Convention”31.  
 
Therefore, the ECtHR accepts that States may express preference or 
constitutionally endorse one religion. This does not in principle affects the 
neutrality of the State. However, this preference cannot amount to an 
institutional policy that would run counter the principles of democracy and 
pluralism underpinning the Convention.  
Whether the State opts for a regime of strict separation from religion 
or whether it constitutionally recognizes preference for one faith, that State 
should in any case act as a “neutral and impartial organizer of the exercise 
of various religions, faith and beliefs”32. This is particularly the case 
whenever arises a conflict between religious groups. In such circumstances, 
the Court has consistently held that “a State’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality […] is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess 
the legitimacy of religious beliefs”33. 
In Hasan and Chaus v Bulgaria the ECtHR grabbed the opportunity to 
clarify the concept of State neutrality toward religious disputes. The case 
originated from a conflict between the government of Bulgaria and the 
Muslim community of the country. In 1992 the majority of the Bulgarian 
Muslim community adopted a new bylaw and elected as new leader Mr. 
Hasan. In 1994, a separate group of the community, in violation of the 
bylaw, elected an alternative leader, Mr. Gendzhev. Following this event, 
Mr. Hasan called for a national conference to solve the dispute. Shortly 
before the conference however, the government of Bulgaria, with an 
unmotivated decision, registered Mr. Gendzhev as the leader of the 
community. Mr. Hasan was re-elected as national leader after the national 
conference, but the government still refused to recognize his legitimacy 
through registration. In its response, Bulgaria submitted that the act of 
replacement of Mr. Hasan had a pure declaratory nature and could not 
affect the exercise of the applicant’s rights under Article 9 nor interfere with 
his right to participating to the organization of the Muslim community. The 
Court argued that by refusing to register Mr. Hasan as leader of the 
community, the authorities demonstrated “a failure […] to remain neutral 
in the exercise of their powers”34. In particular, the Court qualified as 
illegitimate interference the action of the State favoring one leader and 
                                                          
31 Refah Partisi, cit., par. 123.  
32 Refah Partisi, cit., par. 33.  
33 Refah Partisi, cit., par. 91. 
34 Hasan and Chaus, app. no. 30985/90, ECtHR (Judgment), 26 October 2000, par. 78.  
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excluded that States hold discretion over the legitimacy of religious beliefs 
and the means to express them35.  
A similar conclusion was reached in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia 
v. Moldova. The cases concerned the refusal of the Moldovan authorities to 
formally recognize the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, this way 
preventing its members from practicing their faiths and gathering together 
for religious purposes. The Court acknowledged that in a democratic 
society, restrictions on manifestation and exercise of one’s religion may be 
necessary in order to reconcile the interest of various groups. However it 
stressed that “in exercising its regulatory power in this sphere and its 
relations with the various religious groups, denominations and beliefs, the 
State has a duty to remain neutral and impartial”36. Accordingly, it found 
that by refusing to grant legal entity status, Moldova had interfered with 
the rights of believers to associate freely and practice their faith.  
Hasan and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova promotes quite 
a simple and straightforward notion of neutrality, which echoes concepts of 
impartiality. According to this notion, a State cannot consider itself neutral 
unless it guarantees equal respect to different religious communities. 
Neutrality as impartiality consists mainly of two distinctive obligations. On 
the one hand, it embodies first and foremost a negative obligation of non-
interference. The State shall refrain from taking part to disputes that are 
purely religious or that regard the organization of a particular religious 
community. This understanding of State neutrality as abstention from 
actively taking side in religious disputes is a reminder of the classic liberal 
statement that requires the State to refrain from endorsing a particular 
notion of the good.  
On the other hand, neutrality as impartiality may also require a 
positive action on the part of the State directed toward ensuring tolerance 
of competing groups and effective pluralism in the exercise of religious 
beliefs. The Court has affirmed that impartiality may entail recognizing a 
certain legal status to a particular beliefs - as in the case of Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova - but also for example taking the necessary 
measures to ensure that members of a religious community can effectively 
exercise their rights to freedom of religion37. In the view of ensuring 
                                                          
35 Hasan and Chaus, cit., par. 78.  
36 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, app. no. 45701/99, ECtHR 
(Judgment) 13 December 2001, par. 116.  
37 See for example, Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Others v. 
Georgia, app. no. 71156/01, ECtHR (Judgment), 3 May 2005, par. 134.  
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impartiality, the Court also accepts the legitimacy of restrictions placed in a 
manner that reflects and respects the value of pluralism and promotes 
tolerance among different faiths.  
 
 
4 - State’s neutrality vis-à-vis public education: neutrality as objectivity 
 
When dealing with State regulation of the locus of religious in the public 
sphere and public institutions, the understanding of State neutrality 
appears more complex. The teaching of religious modules in public 
education is perhaps one of the areas where the question of the scope and 
meaning of neutrality is more pressing. In the context of the relationship 
between freedom of religion and education, the most relevant provision of 
the Convention is Article 2 of the First Protocol. This article guarantees to 
parents that their children should be educated according to their religious 
and philosophical convictions.  
The reference standard for the ECtHR in assessing to what extent 
State educational institutions may regulate their teaching modules in school 
was set forth in 1976 in Kjeldsen Busk Madsen and Pederson v. Denmark. The 
case did not concern religious education, but rather the refusal of Denmark 
to grant the applicants’ children exemption from being taught sex education 
in schools. In building on the content of the second part of Article 2 of the 
First Protocol, the Court argued that 
 
“The second sentence of Article 2 (P1-2) implies on the other hand that 
the State, in fulfilling the functions assumed by it in regard to 
education and teaching, must take care that information or knowledge 
included in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and 
pluralistic manner. The State is forbidden to pursue an aim of 
indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’ 
religious and philosophical convictions. That is the limit that must not 
be exceed”38.  
 
The Court did not elaborate further on what the test of objectivity 
entail, however later judgments have opted for a rather strict interpretation 
of the concept. The first opportunity to build on the criteria submitted in 
Kjeldsen in the context of religious education emerged in Angeleni v. Sweden. 
The applicant, a self-proclaimed atheist, applied for exemption for her 
daughter from participating in the teaching of religious knowledge, which 
                                                          
38 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pederson v. Denmark, app. no. 5095/71, 5920/72; 5926/72, 
ECtHR (Judgment), 7 December 1976, par. 53 (emphasis added).  
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was an integrated part of the school curriculum. The school rejected the 
request, since only children adhering to another faith than the Swedish 
Church were entitled to be granted exemption. The case was brought before 
the ECtHR, where Ms. Angeleni complained that by refusing to grant 
exemption, Swedish authorities obliged her children to be brought into the 
Christian way of thinking. The applicant also submitted a violation of 
Article 2 of the First Protocol, arguing that Sweden has violated her right to 
bring up her child in an atheistic manner. The Swedish government 
responded that, although Christianity took a major part of the instruction, 
the teaching of the school curriculum could nonetheless be considered 
neutral.  
The Commission did not find any violation of Article 9 of the 
Convention. On the contrary, it grounded its argumentation on the lack of 
evidence that the applicant’s child “has been obliged to participate in any 
form of religious worship or that she has been exposed to any religious 
indoctrination”39. It was also stressed that “the fact that the instruction in 
religious knowledge focuses on Christianity at a junior level at school does 
not mean that the second applicant has been under religious 
indoctrination”40. This is a relevant point, for it proves that the sole 
provision by a State of a teaching module biased toward a particular 
religion is not sufficient for the State to be failing its duty of neutrality. A 
breach of Article 9 would occur only should it be established that children 
have been subject to indoctrination.  
The question of indoctrination deserves further attention. 
Indoctrination is a process of learning aimed at inculcating a child with a 
certain faith. Forms of indoctrination may occur for example when the 
teaching is uncritical, or when it consists of participating in religious 
activities such as praying or reading the Bible, or when the State prevents 
students belonging to other faiths to opt out of religious classes. 
Indoctrination entails therefore a form of active coercion on the part of the 
State which, in order to fulfill its obligation of neutrality, would only be 
required to abstain from pursuing forms of learning directly or indirectly 
seeking to endorse adherence to a certain faith. A State duty to abstain from 
indoctrination is certainly less constraining than a State duty to ensure that 
religious instruction is taught in an “objective, critical and pluralistic 
manner”. Objectivity implies not only the duty of the State to abstain from 
directly or indirectly inculcating adherence to a certain religion, but it 
                                                          
39 Angeleni v. Sweden, app. no. 10491/83, ECtHR (Admissibility), 3 December 1986, p. 49. 
40 Angeleni, cit., p. 49.  
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arguably entails also a positive and more burdensome obligation to ensure 
some degree of equidistance and equal respect for different faiths.  
The distinction between prohibition from indoctrination and duty to 
be objective can be better appreciated in more recent ECtHR decisions. In 
Folgerø and others v. Norway, a complaint was submitted by a group of 
members of the Norwegian Humanist Association against the 
arrangements of Norwegian public school for religious education. 
Similarly, to Angeleni, the applicants complained to have been denied full 
exemption from the compulsory ‘KLR’ course on Christianity, religion and 
philosophy, arguing that the subject was not critical, pluralistic, objective 
and neutral. In their view, the school curriculum was quantitatively and 
qualitatively biased in favor of the Christian beliefs and tradition, in a 
country with extreme Christian predominance and a constitutionally 
established State church. Furthermore, the applicants did not disagree with 
the intention to promote intercultural dialogue, and shared many of the 
aims of the Norwegian government in organizing the KLR subject. 
However, they contended that, as organized, the school subject could not 
be considered objective and neutral.  
This time, the Court agreed with the applicants and found a violation 
of Article 2 of Protocol one of the Convention. To reach this conclusion, the 
Strasbourg judges attentively scrutinized the program of the KLR subject 
and the teaching methods, testing their findings against the criteria of 
objectivity and pluralism. In particular, it was argued that the curriculum 
was unbalanced not only in “quantitative but even qualitative differences 
applied to the teaching of Christianity”41, this way compromising the 
objective of “understanding, respect, and the ability to maintain a dialogue 
between people with different perception of beliefs and convictions”42. 
What is interesting of Folgerø is that the Court did not depart from 
the assertion that mere imbalance in terms of quantity in the teaching of a 
particular religion does not impair objectivity and pluralism. On the 
contrary, the Court affirmed that it was within the margin of appreciation 
of the Norwegian State to adopt a curriculum that devoted greater attention 
to Christianity than other religions43. Hence, this case shows that the notion 
of objectivity the Court strives to convey is something that situates in 
between the prohibition of indoctrination and equality of treatment of 
                                                          
41 Folgerø and Others v. Norway, app. no. 15472/02, ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 29 June 
2007, par. 95. 
42 Folgerø, cit., p. 95.  
43 Folgerø, cit., p. 89.  
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different religions. On the one hand, by insisting on the margin of 
appreciation of States to express a degree of preference over one faith, the 
Court affirms that strict religion equality is not protected under the 
European Convention. The obligation of neutrality of a State in relation to 
education does not requires the State to assume a position of equi-distance 
vis-à-vis different faiths and to treat different religions in the same manner. 
On the other hand, the Court also acknowledges that to be neutral implies 
something more than simply abstaining from adopting a curriculum that 
forcibly encourages adherence to a certain faith. For the Court, neutrality is 
fully achieved only when the State ensures that other religions and 
philosophical understandings are given at least equal respect and 
appropriate attention.  
This approach has been confirmed and clarified by subsequent 
rulings. In Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey for example, the issue at stake 
was not that the majority of the school curriculum in religion was devoted 
to the illustration and teaching of Islam. Instead, the case concerned the way 
in which the school implemented the teaching of other religions. The Court 
ruled that the Turkish system of religious education, although in principle 
compatible with the criteria of pluralism and objectivity, violated the rights 
of the parents belonging to the Alevi stream of Islam to have their child 
adequately exposed to the foundations and precepts of the Alevi faith. The 
argument put forth by the Court was that the teaching of Islam was limited 
to the Sunni understanding and did not take into sufficient account 
Alevism, to which a considerable proportion of the Turkish population 
belong44. In addition, the possibility for parents to apply for exemption from 
the course was available only to those belonging to the Christian or the 
Jewish faiths45.  
 
 
                                                          
44 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, app. no. 1448/04, ECtHR (Judgment), 9 October 
2007, par. 76-77. 
45 Hasan and Eylem Zengin, cit., par. 77. See also Mansur Yalçin and others v. Turkey, app. 
no. 21163/2011, ECtHR (Judgment), 16 February 2015. This case is very similar to Hasan 
and Eylem and dealt with children of the Alevi faith being prevented from exempting 
courses on religious culture and ethics, deemed by the applicant not objective, critical and 
pluralist. The Court did scrutinized once again the syllabus of the course, in light of the 
changes made by the government of Turkey after Hasan and Eylem. It found that, despite 
these changes, the syllabus continued to be disproportionally focused on the Sunni 
teaching of Islam, and was not compatible with a State that acts upon its duty of 
impartiality and neutrality.  
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5 - State neutrality vis-à-vis religious symbols in the public sphere: 
neutrality as exclusion of religion 
 
The last model of State neutrality that deserves close scrutiny touches upon 
the display of religious symbols or clothing in the public spaces.  
The way the ECtHR has dealt with State neutrality vis-à-vis the 
display or religious symbols or clothing in the public sphere has given rise 
to ambiguities and criticism. This is primarily because in this area, the Court 
has increasingly treated the notion of neutrality in an exclusionary rather 
than inclusive way. In several cases, the Court has upheld the State’s 
argument whereby neutrality shall be interpreted as “exclusion of religion 
from the public sphere”, so as to preserve the image of public spaces and 
institutions as neutral platforms freed of any unwanted pressure.  
In Dahlab v. Switzerland, the applicant was a primary school teacher 
converted to Islam who complained of the school authorities’ decision to 
prohibit her from wearing the Islamic scarf at school. The Court argued that 
the restriction on wearing the hijab was justified “by the potential 
interference with the religion’s belief of her pupils, other pupils at the 
school and the pupil’s parents, and by the breach of the principle of 
denominational neutrality in school”46.  
In the view of the Court, the measure implemented by the school 
authorities served first of all to preserve the rights and freedom of the 
others, public order and safety. However, the Court did not restrict itself to 
only appealing to the principle of neutrality of public spaces as justification 
for the restriction. It also labeled the wearing of the Islamic scarf as a 
“powerful external symbol” that could have some kind of proselytism effect 
on school children. In a critical yet controversial passage, the Court held 
 
“[I]t cannot be denied outright that the wearing of the headscarf might 
have some kind of proselytism effect, seeing that it appears to be 
imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and 
which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the principle 
of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the 
wearing of the Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect 
for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all 
teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils”47. 
 
Hence, for the Court it is not just the wearing of a religious symbol 
that affects the condition of neutrality State authorities may want to pursue, 
                                                          
46 Dahlab v. Switzerland, app. 42393/98, ECtHR (Judgment), 15 February 2001, pp. 12-13. 
47 Dahlab, cit., p. 13.  
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but it is the wearing of certain symbols with the message they allegedly 
convey, that needs regulating in order to preserve the rights and freedoms 
of the others. This is a line of argument that the Court restated in Leyla Şahin 
v. Turkey, which was a case involving not a teacher’s wearing of the Islamic 
scarf but a university student being prohibited to wear the hijab in class or 
during exams. Weighing upon the concept of secularism in Turkey and the 
rise within the country of Islamist political movements, the Grand Chamber 
deemed legitimate the decision of Turkish authorities. It supported the 
argument that the wearing of the Islamic scarf could amount to pressure on 
women wishing not to wear it and could impair pluralism, gender equality 
and the rights of the others48.  
The idea that mere externalization of religious beliefs through the 
wearing of symbols is source of pressure and exclusion of others is open to 
criticism. Neither in Dahlab nor in Leyla Şahin the Court verified whether the 
applicants’ attitude could in concreto affect the rights of the others not to be 
pressured into one faith. Furthermore, if in the case of Dahlab one could 
oppose the influence that a State teacher might exert on her pupils, in Leyla 
Şahin the applicant was a private individual and at stake was the freedom 
of conscience of her university peers. Overall, this demonstrates that the 
Court accepts a notion of State neutrality, which includes sheer neutrality 
of public institutions and public agents as well as ‘neutrality’ of private 
individuals when accessing public places. Such a quite far-reaching 
interpretation has in fact been forcefully endorsed by the ECtHR in several 
of its rulings49 and has extended to the wearing of religious symbols in work 
places50 and public areas.  
For example, a number of cases brought before the Court have dealt 
with the legitimacy of legislative measures aimed at prohibiting the 
concealment of one’s face in public places. Starting from 2010, some 
European States such as France and Belgium have adopted legislations 
banning the wearing in public spaces of clothing that partially or totally 
cover the face. In S.A.S. v. France, a French national and practicing Muslim 
challenged before the ECtHR the 2010 French law prohibiting the 
concealment of one’s face in public. The applicant contended that this 
                                                          
48 Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, app. no. 44744/98, ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 10 November 2005, 
par. 115. 
49 Dogru v. France, app. no. 27058/05, ECtHR (Admissibility), 4 December 2008; 
Kurtulmuș v. Turkey, app. no. 65500/01, ECtHR (Admissibility), 24 January 2006; Fatma 
Karadunman v. Turkey, app. no. 41296/04 (Judgment), 3 April 2007. 
50 Ebrahimian v. France, app. no. 64846/11, ECtHR (Judgment), 26 November 2015. 
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measure could not be justified on the ground of promoting gender equality, 
that it exacerbated inequality and discrimination against Muslim women 
and that it would impair pluralism within French society. On its part, 
France submitted that the restriction on the wearing of the full face was to 
ensure the protection of the rights and freedom of the others, including “the 
respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society”51.  
The Court shared this view and found no violation of Article 9 of the 
Convention. It accepted that the barrier raised against others by the veil 
could infringe the minimum requirements of life of a democratic society 
and the rights of others to live in a place of socialization52. After labeling 
pluralism and tolerance as the «hallmark of a “democratic society”», the 
Court admitted that pluralism may entail a “spirit of compromise” on the 
part of individuals or groups thereof, in order to preserve the values of a 
democratic society; 
 
“It indeed falls within the powers of the State to secure the conditions 
whereby the individuals can live together in their diversity. Moreover, 
the Court is able to accept that a State may find it essential to give 
particular weight in this connection to the interaction between 
individuals and may consider this to be adversely affected by the fact 
that some conceal their faces in public places”53. 
 
Hence, the Court accepted that the need to ensure the respect for the 
minimum values of democracy could be deemed as an element of the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of the others, and it may justify a ban 
on certain religious symbols with the view of preserving the conditions of 
‘living together’. 
Coming back to the question of neutrality, the idea that a State 
wishing to act as a neutral organizer of the public sphere may de facto limit 
pluralism resonates well with the Strasbourg judges. Neutrality implicates 
that a State may exclude the manifestation - one may even argue, the 
practice54 - of religion through the wearing of symbols in order to strike a 
                                                          
51 S.A.S. v. France, app. no. 43835/11, ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 1 July 2014, par. 82.  
52 S.A.S., cit., par. 121-122. 
53 S.A.S., cit., par. 141. 
54 See J.H.H. WEILER, Je Suis Achbita!, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 
XV, 2017, pp. 880-883. The Author argues that the wearing of the headscarf or the skullcap 
is an identity marker that allows people who wear it to practice their religion rather than 
simply manifesting it. This means that when the Court assesses the legitimacy of bans over 
the wearing of these symbols, the proportionality test should be conducted taking into 
account that the State is not “forbidding someone from manifesting his or her religious 
identity”, but rather “coercing them to violate religious norms which they considered 
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balance between the freedom of conscience of the individual and the rights 
and freedom of others. This is certainly a conception of neutrality that is 
closely linked to the specific notion of laicité as enshrined in the French 
Constitution. Yet it is an approach that has been confirmed by the Court in 
subsequent decisions, very recently in Dakir v. Belgium55, and in Belcacemi 
and Oussar v. Belgium56. In both cases, the ECtHR held that the ban on 
wearing in public clothing that conceal the face does not violate Article 9 of 
the Convention for it seeks to guarantees the conditions of ‘living together’ 
in Belgian society.  
The rulings of the Court on the ban of religious clothing accord much 
weight to the margin of appreciation of States in the matter. The Court 
seems to assume that the State is in a better position than an international 
body to evaluate questions on the impact of the wearing of religious 
symbols in a democratic society. Hence, the Court in principle is willing to 
accept as legitimate State restrictions that are justified with the view of 
preserving the essential values of a democratic society.  
Admittedly, this conception of neutrality raises a number of issues. 
First, it raises the question of the extent to which a State’s claim of neutrality 
can legitimately exclude manifestations of religion on the part of 
minorities57. After all, the deference shown by the Court toward the stances 
of the responding governments boosts a far-flung notion of neutrality that 
is opposite to the conception of human rights and neutrality in their purest 
liberal form. According to the ‘negative rights’ liberal viewpoint, the 
international protection of human rights is a shield that protects the 
individual from the excesses of a State. Thus, in the context of freedom to 
manifest and practice one’s religion, neutrality should first and foremost 
interpreted as the absence of State’s intervention in the public sphere, so as 
to protect the individual’s liberty and to ensure pluralism. Yet, the 
                                                          
sacred”.  
55 Dakir v. Belgium, app. no. 4619/12, ECtHR (Judgment), 11 December 2017.  
56 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, app. no. 37798/13, ECtHR (Judgment), 11 December 
2017. 
57 In this regard, the only two cases regarding strict secular States in which the Court 
did not uphold the policy of exclusionary neutrality implemented by the State were Ahmet 
Arslan and Others v. Turkey, app. no. 41135/98, ECtHR (Judgment), 23 February 2010, 
concerning the wearing by a religious group of the headgear and religious garments in 
public streets, and Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, app. 57792/15, ECtHR (Judgment), 
5 March 2018, concerning the expulsion and fine of a criminal witness refusing to take off 
his skullcap. In both cases the Court provided that the policies of neutrality implemented 
by both States were beyond the limit imposed by Article 9.  
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impression that ensues from the rulings in S.A.S. v. France and similar cases 
is that the collective dimension of the freedom of conscience and religion - 
for example the protection of the rights and freedom of the others - is 
privileged at the expenses of the individual’s right. The State that decides 
to restrict certain manifestations of religion in public spaces does not 
encounter much obstacle from the ECtHR should it claim to do so in 
pursuant of neutrality and protection of essential (and arguably 
majoritarian) societal values. Such interpretation of neutrality is easily 
subject to instrumentalization. The risk is that a State may implement a form 
of “selective pluralism”58 while attempting to preserve the foundational 
values of its democracy. Furthermore, the Court, rather than ensuring 
tolerance among competing groups through peaceful coexistence, may 
eventually endorse State’s policies that eliminate or significantly reduce 




6 - ‘Reversed’ patters of neutrality: the disruptive effect of Lautsi v. Italy  
 
Neutrality as exclusion of religion from the public sphere is not the only 
paradigm that the Court has adopted when facing the problem of religious 
symbol. In Lautsi v. Italy, the Strasbourg judges were confronted with the 
problem of assessing the legitimacy of the presence of a religious symbol 
such as the crucifix in a public educational institution.  
The circumstances of the case are very well known. The applicant 
and her two sons argued that the crucifix affixed to the wall of the classroom 
attended by the latter violated Article 9 of the Convention as well as the 
rights of parents to educate their children in accordance with their 
conviction. Initially the Chamber unanimously ruled in favor of the 
applicants finding a violation of Article 9 and Article 2 of the First Protocol 
of the Convention. It contended that the religious meaning attached to the 
crucifix impaired the rights of the applicant to believe or not believe, and 
undermined the neutrality of the State. According to the Chamber, the State 
had a duty to ensure confessional neutrality in public education and refrain 
                                                          
58 See S.A.S., cit., Separate Opinion Judges Nussberger and Jaderblom, par. 14. 
59 The Court has in several cases consistently reiterated that the role of State authorities 
vis-à-vis religious matters “is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, 
but to ensure that competing groups tolerate each others”, see originally Serif v. Greece, app. 
no 38178/97, ECtHR (Judgment), 14 December 1999, par. 53. 
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from imposing, even indirectly, a belief in a place where people are 
particularly vulnerable60.  
The Grand Chamber took however a difference stance and in 2011 
reversed the Chamber’s decision finding no breach of the Convention. First, 
the Court approached the issue of a State’s endorsement of a religious 
symbol in a public institution. The Italian government had submitted to the 
Court that the presence of the crucifix in State school classrooms should 
have been interpreted as an historical, rather than religious, symbol 
representing principles and values at the core of Italian democracy. The 
Court did not delve into the historical and traditional connotations attached 
to the crucifix, however it did establish that a State’s wide margin of 
appreciation allows the latter to endorse the presence of religious symbols 
in State schools. Basically, the argument set forth on this point was that the 
lack of a European consensus on the presence of religious symbols in public 
schools accounts for a wide margin of appreciation granted to States.  
The second argument upon which the Grand Chamber decision was 
based regards the influence that the display of the crucifix in a classroom 
may bear on school children. According to the Court, there was no evidence 
that the presence of the crucifix in school could have influenced children to 
the point of interfering with their rights protected under the Convention. 
The Court described the crucifix as “an essentially passive symbol”61 and 
excluded that “the presence of the crucifix in classroom had encouraged the 
development of teaching practices with a proselytism tendency”62. The 
Court also asserted that the absence of a compulsory teaching about 
Christianity along with the pluralism ensured by Italian authorities in 
classroom - through allowing children to wear for example the Islamic 
headscarf or other religious symbols - ruled out any form of indoctrination 
on the part of the State63.  
Lautsi v. Italy is quite a departure from the Court’s previous rulings 
on both the display of religious symbols in the public sphere and the 
relationship between religion and State education. The decision is certainly 
in tension with the Court’s position expressed in Dahab, Sahin and S.A.S., 
which enforced a notion of neutrality as exclusion of religion from the 
public sphere. In these cases, the Court contended that the wearing of 
                                                          
60 Lautsi v. Italy, 30814/06, ECtHR (Judgment, Second Section), 3 November 2009, par. 
48. 
61 Lautsi v. Italy, 30814/06, ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 18 March 2011, par. 72.  
62 Lautsi (Grand Chamber), cit., par. 74.  
63 Lautsi (Grand Chamber), cit., par. 74. 
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religious symbols at school or in public areas could affect the rights and 
freedoms of the others. On the contrary, Lautsi purports a notion of 
neutrality, which is not only non-exclusionary, but also in conflict with the 
very idea of the public as a space void of any religious connotation. The 
Court explains such divergence by insisting on the margin of appreciation 
available to States. Yet, this approach is not fully convincing. Firstly, 
because it fails to account why the wearing of the headscarf by a teacher in 
school shall be regarded as a powerful religious symbols, whereas the 
crucifix affixed to a school wall should be only deemed as a passive one. In 
Dahab, the Court argued that the Islamic scarf might have some kind of 
proselytism effect on children, despite Switzerland being a country by a 
wide majority Christian and with a relatively small Muslim community. In 
Lautsi on the other hand, the presence of the crucifix in schools was 
considered not capable of exerting pressure on the rights and freedoms of 
pupils.  
A second critique toward the margin of appreciation argument 
touches upon the very reason behind the use of this doctrine by the Court. 
In Lautsi, Sahin and S.A.S, the ECtHR argued that the absence of a European 
consensus on the issue of religious symbols in schools justifies the enhanced 
recourse to the State’s margin of appreciation. However, it is not clear how 
the absence of consensus should have a bear on the Court’s power to 
determine the constraints of a State’s claim of neutrality64. In other words, 
diversity in the European context should not prevent an international court 
from establishing the legitimacy of a State’s policy of neutrality under the 
Convention. Neutrality should be construed by the Court as a paradigm 
that sets clear limits and constraints on State action, and should be subject 
to international scrutiny based on State’s respect of such constraints. This 
does not mean of course that the concept of neutrality should not be wide 
enough to accommodate regime diversity throughout Europe; at the same 
time, diversity per se cannot operate as a ground for the Court’s refusal to 
critically examine the limits of State’s action.  
Finally, the Court’s decision in Lautsi struggles to reconcile with the 
consistent approach adopted by the Court ever since Folgerø in matters 
related to religion and public education. In Folgerø and in subsequent 
rulings, the ECtHR has anchored the limits of a State’s margin of 
appreciation to the criteria of objectivity, criticism, pluralism and absence 
of indoctrination. Yet, Lautsi seems to only abide by the requirement of non-
                                                          
64 See in this regard, D. KYRITSIS, S. TSAKYRAKIS, Neutrality in the Classroom, in 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. XI, 2013, pp. 215-216. 
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indoctrination. The Grand Chamber was only concerned with establishing 
whether the presence of the crucifix could have a proselytism or 
indoctrination effect of school children and ignored the fact that education 
shall be delivered in a manner that is objective, critical and pluralist. One 
may argue that the presence of the crucifix in Italian schools is not linked to 
the compulsory teaching of Christianity, and that explains why the Court 
overlooked the issue. But the fact remains that the ECtHR failed to explain 
why the preference expressed by the State for Christianity could not affect 
objectivity and pluralism.  
 
 
7 - Concluding remarks: decoding the patterns of State neutrality in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
 
The analysis of the most relevant case law concerning the relation between 
a State and religious matters has shown that State neutrality is a distinctive 
principle enshrined in the European Convention. The Court has often made 
explicit reference to the obligation of States to remain neutral in the exercise 
of their power vis-à-vis religious matters or the obligation to act with 
neutrality and objectivity in issues related to education.  
Our analysis of the ECtHR jurisprudence shows however that the 
approach developed by the Court toward the scope of State neutrality is 
rather inconsistent. On the one hand, in matters related to disputes of 
religious communities, the Court tends adopt an approach aimed at 
protecting religious communities from the interference of the State. This 
was the case in Hasan and Chaus v. Bulgaria, and in Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia v. Moldova, where the Court afforded protection to religious 
communities affected by positive (in the case of Hasan) or negative (in the 
case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia) interferences of the State in their 
right to organize and practice their faith. Also in the context of the 
relationship between religion and State educational curricula the Court has 
in principle been keen to a notion of State neutrality capable of ensuring to 
different faiths and philosophical convictions equal respect. Folgerø, Hasan 
and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey and Mansur Yalçin and others v. Turkey are all 
example of the attempt of the European Court to make sure that the State 
acts as an impartial organizer of religious instruction and as advocate of 
pluralism.  
On the other hand, a different line of cases takes an opposite view 
and seeks to justify the State’s intrusion in the individual’s full enjoyment 
of her freedom of religion rights. In Dahlab, Leyla Şahin, S.A.S and most cases 
related to the wearing of religious symbols, the Court upheld policies 
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restricting selected types of conduct on the part of individuals, in pursuit of 
a conceptual ideal of neutrality ingrained in the secular model adopted by 
some States.  
These two distinguishable patters in the ECtHR jurisprudence reflect 
the existence of two opposing tensions, which drive much of the legal 
reasoning of the Court in this area. Such opposing forces are the Court’s 
attempt to fully realize the liberal ambitions underpinning the European 
Convention, and the Court’s inclination toward the endorsement of 
particular societal paradigms.65 It is undisputed that when the Court calls 
for the abstention of the State in religious disputes or when it attentively 
scrutinizes a State’s educational syllabus to assess its objectivity and 
impartiality, the Court is relying on the concept of ‘neutrality of aim’ in its 
purest liberal form. The Court’s approach in these cases consists of 
ascertaining whether the policy or the measures enforced by the State can 
be justified by considerations that are not sectarian. Neutrality as absence 
of interference or absence of preference on the part of the State represents 
therefore the Court’s maximal pursuit of its liberal goals.  
On the contrary, when the Court opts for diminishing an individual’s 
right to exercise freedom of religious or conscience, it does so often because 
it considers the individual’s exercise of that right in conflict with the 
relevant societal paradigm. The jurisprudence on the display of religious 
symbols in the public sphere is a clear example of the Court’s concern for 
accommodating the collective identity of the State at the expenses of the 
individual’s right to freedom of religion. Some scholars have praised this 
approach noting how the margin of appreciation doctrine accorded in this 
area allows for the coexistence of different State-religion models across 
Europe66. Yet, the deference shown by the Court toward certain State-
religion models is a cause of concern since, as aptly suggested by Evans and 
Petkoff, “it aligns the application of the human rights apparatus with the 
political status quo”67. 
The tension between liberalism and parochial aspirations can be very 
much appreciated in Lautsi. When Lautsi was discussed before the Second 
                                                          
65 See in this regard M. EVANS, P. PETKOFF, A Separation of Convenience? The Concept 
of Neutrality in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in Religion, State & 
Society, vol. XXXVI, 2008, pp. 213-214. 
66 See for example I. LEIGH, R. AHDAR, Post-Secularism and the European Court of 
Human Rights, in Modern Law Review, vol. LXXV, 2012. 
67 M. EVANS, P. PETKOFF, A Separation of Convenience?, cit., p. 211; See also G. DE 
VERGOTTINI, Oltre il dialogo tra le Corti. Giudici, diritto straniero, comparazione, il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2010, p. 83. 
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Chamber, the Court did test the circumstances of the case against the criteria 
of neutrality, objectivity and pursuit of education in a pluralistic manner, 
and eventually held, in quite a liberal fashion, that the presence of the 
crucifix in classroom could interfere with the applicants’ right to freedom 
of religion. When the case was referred to the Grand Chamber however, the 
Court made sure to afford enough weight to the societal paradigm in force 
in Italy, and opted for an interpretation of neutrality that echoed the notion 
of ‘consequential neutrality’68. 
The erratic fashion in which the Court has dealt with cases on 
religious symbols leads us to a further and last argument, which looks at 
the legal issues at stake from a more sociological perspective. After Lautsi, 
the ECtHR had more opportunities to revisit its jurisprudence on religious 
symbols. As far as the wearing of Islamic scarf is concerned however, the 
Court has yet to depart from the approach adopted in S.A.S v. France. 
Ebrahim v. France, along with the very recent Dakir v. Belgium, and Belcacemi 
and Oussar v. Belgium are all cases that dealt with the legitimacy of a State’s 
ban on the wearing of headscarf in public spaces. The Court has always 
upheld the respondent State’s policies of neutrality and each time has found 
no violation of Article 9 of the Convention. 
Only in two recent cases the Court has ruled in favor of the 
applicant’s right to freedom of religion. One is Eweida and Chaplin v. United 
Kingdom, where the Court had to determine whether the British domestic 
law had failed to adequately protect the freedom to manifest religion of a 
hostess of British Airways prevented from visibly wearing the Christian 
crosses at work. The other is Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the 
applicant, a witness of a criminal trial, was expelled from the courtroom 
and later convicted of contempt of court for refusing to remove his Islamic 
skullcap. In both cases the ECtHR found a violation of Article 9 of the 
Convention. In Eweida, the Court argued that the policy of neutrality 
implemented by British Airways could not justify the prohibition imposed 
to the applicant, since there was no concrete violation of the rights of the 
others69. In Hamidović, the Court insisted on the notion of pluralism and 
                                                          
68 D. KYRITSIS, S. TSAKYRAKIS, Neutrality in the Classroom, cit., pp. 213-214. The 
Authors argue that the Grand Chamber in Lautsi sticked to the conception of consequential 
neutrality since it took into account external features of the Italian educational environment 
in order to assess whether there had been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. In 
particular, the Court questioned whether the negative effects of the presence of the crucifix 
in class were somehow counterbalanced by the tolerant policy adopted by Italy vis-à-vis 
the manifestation of other religions and faiths.  
69 Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom, app. no. 48420/10, 59842/10, 36516/10, 
ECtHR (Judgment), 27 May 2013, par. 94-95. 
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excluded that the policy of sheer neutrality of public spaces could be 
applied to a private individual being asked to appear before a Court as a 
witness70. It is noteworthy that Hamidović is also one of the very few cases 
dealing with freedom of religion of persons belonging to the Islamic faith 
where the ECtHR has found a violation in favor of the applicant. It is 
difficult to establish whether these two cases constitute a genuine 
development of the Court’s previous jurisprudence on religious symbols. 
After all, the United Kingdom and Bosnia are not based on a principle of 
strict secularism and sheer religious neutrality like France or Belgium. Yet, 
both decision surely afford more protection and weight to an individual’s 
right to freedom of religion and conscience. Furthermore, in Hamidović, the 
Court has insisted on the policy of tolerance and pluralism that a State 
should pursue toward other religions. Rather than focusing simply on 
proportionality in the present case, the Court simply stressed that “an 
individual who has made religion a central tenet of his or her life […] 
[should be] able to communicate that belief to others”; furthermore, it was 
noted that “the applicant’s act was inspired by his sincere religious belief 
that he must wear at skullcap at all times”71. This is a welcome departure 
from the Court’s previous rulings, for it seemingly reinforces the 
individual’s right to manifest her own religion by recognizing the 
inextricable link between the wearing of a religious symbol and her identity. 
 
                                                          
70 Hamidović, cit., par. 41.  
71 Hamidović, cit., par. 41. 
